Suchergebnisse

Introduction: improvising pietism -- The prayers and tears of young Fritz -- The euthanasia of Christianity -- The piety of Zarathustra -- Nietzsche's decadence -- Socrates' fate -- Wagner's redemption -- Paul's revenge -- Deconstructing the redeemer -- Nietzsche's musical askēsis -- We, too, are still pious

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Foreword -- Preface. Why the Timing Might Be Right -- Acknowledgments -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Partial Privatization -- 3. Potential Benefits and Pitfalls of Contracting Out for Criminal Justice -- 4. Private Inputs into "Public" Arrest and Prosecution -- 5. The Level and Scope of Private Production of Crime Prevention and Protection -- 6. Private Justice in America -- 7. The Benefits of Privatization -- 8. Alleged Market Failures in a Privatized System of Criminal Justice -- 9. Why Is the Public Sector So Involved with Criminal Law Today? -- 10. Restitution in a Rights-Based Approach to Crime Policy -- 11. Encouraging Effective Privatization in Criminal Justice, Part I -- 12. Encouraging Effective Privatization in Criminal Justice, Part II -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index -- About the Author

The number of inmates in federal and state prisons in the US fell slightly from its 2009 peak of 1,615,487 to 1,571,013 in 2012 (Carson and Golinelli 2013). This reduction allegedly provides persuasive evidence of what some experts say is a 'sea change' in America's approach to criminal punishment, but a 2.75% reduction after a 500% increase over the previous three decades (Sentencing Project 2013) is far from a sea change. This essay proposes this very sea change, explores its feasibility, considers the institutional changes that would accompany it, and outlines its substantial benefits. Decriminalization does not mean legalization when there is an identifiable victim. Violent and property offenses were not always crimes, but they have always been illegal. Decriminalization also implies that public institutions currently involved in criminal justice would not have responsibility for pursuit, prosecution, or punishment. Adapted from the source document.

Alcohol‐related traffic accidents are externalities, not because of drinking, but because of relatively free access to public roads. Access limits are Coasian (property‐rights) policies, but more effective limits will arise if road owners are liable for failing to provide safe roads. This can be achieved by privatising roads, thereby creating strong incentives to employ innovative private traffic policing.

Argues that eminent domain is not always justified even if "market failure arising from the holdout problem prevents some potentially desirable (efficient?) property transfers." The evolution of the government's power to confiscate property & the demand for compensatory payments is traced to point out the expansion of takings power in England, efforts to constrain it, & the transplantation of practices of condemnation to the American colonies. Special attention is given to efforts to limit government powers to confiscate property in the US Constitution. It is contended that eminent-domain powers did not develop as the result of holdout problems. They actually started with government ownership of property & the market-failure argument was a later rationalization for government's realization of this power. The struggle for property rights progressed gradually in the direction of private-property rights protected by various constraints on government. The backlash against the US Supreme Court's decision in the property-rights case, Kelo v. City of New London, is another example of reactions against government efforts to expand its powers. References. J. Lindroth

Explores the eminent domain justification for government provision of roads from three perspectives to expose its invalidity. Evidence is marshaled to demonstrate that the private sector is willing & able to site, construct, & operate roads, suggesting that even if eminent domain is invoked to obtain right-of-way, that right-of-way can be turned over to the private sector. The alleged market failure justification for the use of eminent domain to obtain right-of-way properties is examined, asserting that the holdout problem assumed to prevent private sector acquisitions of land for roadways is not as pronounced as assumed. It is then contended that use of eminent domain is undesirable for various government-failure reasons. J. Zendejas

Uncertainty prevents voluntary interactions, but institutions of trust and/or recourse can substitute for knowledge by making promises relatively credible. Trust and various sources of recourse are imperfect substitutes, however, as demonstrated by consideration of the trade‐offs between trust based on repeated dealings, recourse to informal private sanctions such as reputation threats, ostracism sanctions and third‐party dispute resolution through formal commercial organizations operating under customary law, and the state's coercive legal system. The problems of knowledge and interest imply that, though not perfect, private sources of trust and recourse are superior in emerging markets to state‐provided recourse.